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Abstract 
Transfers between generations are a key driver of social and economic inequalities, 
ensuring that wealth is not redistributed, but accumulated instead in the hands of a small 
elite, sometimes described as ‘the super-rich’. It is crucial to understand how this 
accumulated capital is socialized and passed down the generations through a labour that I 
argue is gendered in nature, heavily reliant on women, and currently under-researched. In 
this paper I address this gap ethnographically, focusing on the gendered labour that women 
perform to sustain and reproduce the dynastic projects of elite families. I compare and 
contrast the symbolically distant categories of mothers/wives (Ostrander 1984) and “girls” – 
young women who socialize on the VIP scene, as defined by Mears (2015). Both groups 
involve biologically female bodies deeply involved in the reproduction of elites but the 
categories they inhabit, the selves that are both ascribed to them and which they choose to 
present could not be any more different. In light of this data, elite London emerges as a 
social space structured around strong hierarchies not just of class but also gender. I 
therefore argue that it is essential to understand more about the interplay of these two 
structuring principles within elite spaces, focusing on the ‘invisible’ labour performed by elite 
women. 
 
Keywords: elites; gender; social reproduction; super-rich; women; accumulation; wealth; 
  class; inheritance 
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Introduction 
 
Contemporary elites are never static: they are dynasties, in the making, always. As Savage 
(2015) argues, following Piketty (2014), we should be thinking about elites in terms of the 
long dureé: a slow and constant process of accumulation. This process involves not just 
economic assets – although they are undoubtedly crucial to elite formation processes – but 
also social, educational and symbolic capitals. It is not, however, just about accumulating 
capitals: it is about capitals and people, entwined together to forge long lasting dynasties. As 
an elite wealth manager explained, it’s not just about preparing the money for the children. 
It’s preparing the children for the money. What he meant was that it was essential to create 
the kind of human being who would be capable of handling an inheritance when the time 
came. Moreover, someone who would be able to increase the capital he would receive (yes, 
he: more on the gender balance of inheritors later) and then hand it over successfully to the 
next generation. 
 
It is these processes that I am interested in, and will explore in this chapter: how are these 
individuals created and reproduced? How are they socialized, how are these practices 
embodied? I am looking here at the labour of other, female bodies, and their roles in creating 
uber achieving, “alpha” males. I focus specifically on two categories, but I could have used 
many others – these two are by no means exhaustive of the roles women play in the 
reproduction of elites (see Glucksberg 2017 forthcoming). I will compare and contrast the 
symbolically distant categories of mothers/wives (Ostrander 1984) and “girls” – young women 
who socialize on the VIP scene, as defined by Mears (2015). Both groups involve biologically 
female bodies deeply involved in the reproduction of elites but the categories they inhabit, 
the selves that are both ascribed to them and which they choose to present could not be any 
more different.  
 
The argument in this chapter is that gender, women and their labour are key to the 
reproduction of elites. So far, apart from a few exceptions that I will explore later on, gender 
has not been a particular focus of elite studies, and I address this gap with some ethnographic 
examples showing just how crucial its role is. The labour women perform often goes 
unrecognized not just by social scientists but even by the women themselves. This aligns the 
women in this class with the very well established paradigm of the invisibility of gendered, 
reproductive labour. Finally, I question the staggeringly rigid gender norms and expectations 
that I have encountered in my research, and consider whether our understanding of elite 
reproduction could be enriched by a keener focus on the interplays between gender and class 
at the top of the social hierarchy.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Currently, wealth advisors estimate that the biggest wealth transfer event in recorded history 
will take place between 2007 and 2061, and will consist of $59 trillion to be transferred and 
divided amongst heirs, charities and foundations – and that is in the US alone (Rosplock and 
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Houser 2014). Successful transfers of the wealth preserved within families are the main 
preoccupation of wealthy individuals, according to those who advise them (Wealth-X and 
UBS Ultra Wealth Report 2014).  
 
Piketty (2014) and others have convincingly argued western nations may have enjoyed a 
brief period of falling inequality from the twenties to the seventies that was, rather than a 
trend, almost a blip in a much longer historical trajectory of growing inequality, because of 
the weight of capital accumulation by the previous generations. Khan (2012) asks “whether 
elite seizure is an anomaly that will be rectified or a return to the kind of normal dominance 
experienced for much of history”. To put this into context, Oxfam (2015) has released data 
showing that in 2014 the bottom half of the world’s population owned the same as the richest 
80 people in the world.  
 
Transfers between generations are a key driver of social and economic inequalities, ensuring 
that wealth is not redistributed, but accumulated instead in the hands of a small elite, 
sometimes described as ‘the super-rich’. It is crucial to understand how this accumulated 
capital is socialized and passed down the generations through a labour that I argue is 
gendered in nature, heavily reliant on women, and currently under-researched.  
 
Indeed, Savage et al (2014) argue that this is currently one of the most important tasks for 
sociologists:  
 
“What kinds of rituals and symbolic life is characteristic of the super wealthy and 
the broader elite? What is the role of elite education, of residential and 
consumption patterns, of friendship and social networks amongst these groups? 
This is arguably the fundamental sociological question of our age, in exploring 
the kinds of closure and social and cultural elitism which might now characterize 
the very highest levels of the social structure. What kind of kinship alliances, 
elite rituals, and institutional powers do we see around us in 2014?”  
 
(Savage et al 2014: 603) 
 
This concern with the socio-cultural aspects of elite life and reproduction is not, however, 
signalling a retreat from the structural, economic aspects of elite reproduction. I have 
described elsewhere how elites ensure their continuous economic and financial dominance 
through straightforward, long term economic investments and capital accumulation often 
entrusted to teams employed by wealthy families precisely to look after their affairs, their 
‘private’ or family offices (Glucksberg and Burrows 2017). It would be ill advised to fall into 
the trap that Khan (2012:368) warns us against, that of mobilizing ‘cultural’ explanations for 
the advantaged while looking for structural explanations to do with poverty. Studying the 
reproduction of inequalities requires first and foremost an awareness that it is the structural 
conditions of accumulation that capitalism puts in place that work in similar ways to advantage 
those at the top and disadvantage those at the bottom. The elites are then able to employ 
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culture and to some an extent hide and naturalize their own structural advantages, mainly 
through meritocratic discourse – but the current movements against the 1% and the ‘super 
rich’ show this is by no means an entirely successful hegemonic project.  
 
Gendering the elites 
 
There were 2,473 billionaires in the world in 2015 according to leading consultancy WealthX, 
controlling a total wealth equal to 7,683 US billions. 88.1% of them were males, while 11.9% 
were female; the men controlled 88.6% of the total wealth (Wealth-X 2015-2016 Billionaire 
Census Highlights). What is interesting for the purpose of this chapter is, apart from the very 
obvious imbalance that means there are 8.4 male billionaires for each female one, is the 
marriage patterns of these individuals. 85% of all billionaires were married in 2015; the rate 
was as high as 88% for men. In terms of context, in the UK the ONS estimated that 50.6% of 
adults were married, and in the US the Census Bureau put the figure for Americans at 60.1%. 
Taken together, these data seem to suggest that by and large the great majority of billionaires 
are not only men (8.4 male to 1 female) but married men, much more so than the average 
population. 
 
Marriage is clearly important to these men, because it is a fundamental vehicle for the 
production of the future generations of elites. Indeed they appear to be substantially better 
than average at being or remaining married; the available data was not detailed enough to 
understand how many times the individuals in question had been married, but from my own 
qualitative research on succession and family offices (Glucksberg and Burrows 2016) it was 
clear that divorces are frowned upon and avoided at all cost because of the threat of splitting 
the family’s capital. Stable and long-lasting marriages are seen as integral to a ‘successful’ 
dynasty-making project. 
 
The ethnographic data presented in this chapter will show how much labour the women 
invested in these marriages, how they eschewed the development of their own careers for 
the sake of their families and in general accepted gendered norms that seemed hugely 
outdated in their patriarchal character. This is not, however, a new feature of elite women’s 
lives. In 1984, Susan Ostrander wrote what she defined as the first study to focus on women 
of the American upper class, specifically focussing on their labour to preserve and strengthen 
their marriages at all cost. In this book she argued how: 
 
“The work done by upper class women is largely invisible: that is, it is unpaid 
and occurs outside the economic marketplace and labour force. Therefore, the 
women’s role in creating and maintaining the economic and political power of 
the upper class is not typically recognised.” 
   
       (Ostrander 1984:140; italics are mine) 
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Exploring the ways in which elite women understood their own lives through lengthy 
interviews and engagement with them, Ostrander showed how key their labour – though 
invisible and unpaid – was in maintaining and reproducing their own individual, families and 
class position of privilege and power in American society. She also focused on interplays 
between the gender roles that these women played – broadly speaking they obeyed 
traditional, conservative gender norms that saw them being submissive and accommodating 
towards their husbands’ needs and wants – and their superior class positioning vis a vis the 
rest of society, where they were powerful, established upper class women fully aware of their 
privileged positions.  
 
Her argument was that the women accepted to be ‘inferior’ in gender terms within their 
marriages, and submissive to their men, because to oppose these norms would have meant 
to challenge the class structures that those men were upholding. The women had no intention 
of doing this because they rather enjoyed being privileged and upper class: the push towards 
gender liberation was never strong enough to overcome the fear of losing class positioning 
by challenging their husbands’ upholding of patriarchal norms. 
 
From the second half of the 1980s, Yanagisako (2000) has been studying wealthy 
entrepreneurial families engaged in silk production in the north of Italy. Her work describes, 
although with clear variations due to the different cultural landscapes of Italy and the US, 
similarly strict attitudes to gender roles and how women should relate to their families and 
society at large.  
 
“Bourgeois gender ideology rendered female independence an oxymoron” (2000:59), 
explains Yanagisako: daughters are seen as a loss to the family business, because they will 
‘belong’ to the family they will marry into. Nonetheless the biggest threat they represent is 
their potential willingness to claim a share of the family business as inheritance – to which 
they would be entitled to by law – and therefore they are socialised from very early on away 
from the operational family business and towards the social and relational side of the family, 
which is just as important and run entirely by the women.  
 
The socialization of elite women was something that Bourdieu (1996) considered as well, 
linking it to the successful reproduction of elites through the right marriages, the incorporation 
of the correct sort of women into the family tree:  
“Admitting into the family only those women who are capable of embodying and 
inculcating respect for bourgeois virtues – the work ethic, an eye for saving, 
family spirit – fulfils a function entirely similar to the exclusivism that leads to the 
choice of private educational establishments and highly selective meeting 
places.”  
    (Bourdieu 1996: 281) 
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Reflecting on issues of gender and inheritance in the context of Portuguese elite families, 
Pedroso de Lima articulates the complex way in which family members are not just chosen 
but constituted to continue the dynastic line:  
 
“We are not dealing with a univocal transmission process, where continuity is a 
reproduction of the past. In fact we are dealing with a constituting process in 
which the new conjuncture is built by some members of this emerging 
generation, who articulate in their action and strategies, references and values 
from the past […] in the context of the new needs and values for the present.” 
   
      (Pedroso de Lima 2000: 41) 
 
Moving away from the family sphere, other authors have looked instead at the work women 
from elite backgrounds, or in elite professions, or both, perform outside their homes. Rather 
depressingly, the findings still paint a picture of a dominating patriarchal sets of values that 
are not only difficult to escape for women, but impact materially on their earning capacities, 
even at the very top of the financial hierarchy (Atkinson et al 2016).  
 
For example Roth (2003) has shown how women in Wall Street are paid less than their male 
colleagues even after controlling for all other factors, even within a culture that supposedly 
idolised money above all else and therefore did not discriminate on grounds of race, religion, 
gender and so on – or so they’d have liked to believe. Similarly Ho’s (2009) ethnography of 
Wall Street confirms the huge positive biases that exist in favour of white, privileged males to 
the disadvantage of anyone else, and how the practice of pay via bonuses, which are almost 
entirely distributed at the discretion of managers without guidelines or supervision, 
entrenches the inequalities that these firms, and those who work for them, struggle hard to 
deny.  
 
Ho’s detailed work is also useful in showing how “in this flexible, unstructured space […] 
racialised and gendered networks strongly affect who is requested for particular deals, who 
is perceived as ‘getting along’ with the client” (2009:271). I would like to focus on these 
‘unstructured spaces’ where it is important to ‘get along’ with the client, and consider the ways 
in which women perform another function in the reproduction of elites, this time facilitating 
their economic reproduction by providing the backdrop and necessary sociability in their 
leisure spaces.  
 
Mears’s work (2015) on the VIP club scene in and around New York looks at the roles that 
‘girls’ – a social category that some young women inhabit at a certain time in their lives – play 
in facilitating men’s networking and career climbing. It is the ‘girls’ role in constituting the 
spaces that Ho (2009) describes where connections with the clients can be made and 
cultivated that is particularly of interest here: 
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“If you go out with someone who’s a business contact, and meet women and 
party with girls – one of the thing we can enjoy talking about is women, like in 
following-up with the clients… I’ve seen it to be a problem for some women in 
my business … [Clubbing] is very weird because so much of the fun is around 
pursuing women. …A lot of business is won through experiences like this.” 
  
Max, 33, Asian American man, Finance associate 
 
         (Mears 2015: 13) 
 
As will be shown in the ethnographic case studies, the work I conducted resonates strongly 
with that of Mears (2015), and my own data reflect the same importance for young girls in 
constituting the sort of exclusive – for older women, especially – spaces where men can relax, 
have fun and cultivate their personal networks, which they will in turn capitalise on in their 
business capacity. Following Bourdieu’s (1984) work on the concept of embodied capital, and 
Skeggs (2004) revisiting of it in a feminist key, Mears (2015) describes these processes as 
“the uses of women's bodily capital by men who appropriate women as a symbolic resource 
to generate profit, status, and social ties in an exclusive world of businessmen.” 
 
Methodology 
 
The research upon which this paper is based was conducted as part of an ESRC funded 
project looking at the effect of global wealth on the most elite areas of London. 
Methodologically the research was based on a geodemographic framework (Burrows, 2013): 
this meant using a software, called Mosaic, which used complex data sets to determine the 
likely demographic and socio-economic composition of any given neighbourhood in the UK. 
The objects of study were the areas that Mosaic had identified as “Alpha Territories”, 
inhabited by “groups of people with substantial wealth who live in the most sought after 
neighbourhoods in the UK”.  
 
The aim of the project was to respond to the call for the social sciences to start taking the 
‘super-rich’ more seriously (Beaverstock et al, 2004; Hay and Muller, 2011). It tried to capture 
the change happening in these areas, following a ‘spatialization of class’ approach (Burrows 
and Gane, 2006; Parker et al, 2007; Savage et al, 2005; Baque, Bridge et al, 2015), and to 
assess the impact of the huge flows of global financial capital on these neighbourhoods, their 
inhabitants and communities.  
 
An anthropological approach based on ethnography was crucial in creating a successful 
methodology to go beyond what had been done before. Starting from anthropology’s 
approach to the elites (Nader 1972, Shore and Nugent 2002, Abbink and Salverda 2012, 
Carrier and Kalb, 2015) the research was developed in a way that was sensitive to what Khan 
(2012) calls embodied privilege in his close-up, ethnographic study of elite adolescents in the 
US, or Schimpfossl (2014) adopts to look at elite Russians and philanthropy.  
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The areas studied loosely corresponded to what estate agents call prime London (where 
properties sell for above £2m) and sit in a crescent that goes from Chelsea in the south, up 
through South Kensington, Knightsbridge, Belgravia, Mayfair, Notting Hill and Holland Park, 
Hampstead and Highgate in the north. Areas outside of the centre of London but still 
considered by the project were located around Esher, Cobham and Virginia Water, well 
known for claiming the top spots in the most expensive house prices in the UK outside of 
London (Guardian, 11 July 2015). 
 
The project included a number of senior academics from various disciplines in the social 
sciences – sociology, criminology, anthropology, geography and geo-demographics –and 
lasted two and a half years. Collectively over one hundred individuals were interviewed, 
including elite residents as well as a broad spectrum of service providers were actively sought 
as well, from designers to estate agents, from asset managers to art dealers, from beauticians 
to carers and florists. Observations and participant observation when possible were used as 
well.  
 
Ethnographic case studies 
 
The ways in which economic capital and elite status is produced and re-produced are 
profoundly gendered in nature, and heavily reliant on the work of women. The first case study 
I present here is a story of Mayfair by night, of raw financial capital socialized in night clubs 
through textbook conspicuous consumption, which required – amongst other things being 
consumed – the bodies of ‘girls’ to make the night a success. In this section I contextualize 
my work by using Mears’s (2015) account of ‘girls’ in the VIP scene around New York, Los 
Angele, Cannes and St. Barts. The second one focuses on women in the suburbs and their 
work, whether in property development as a side line or, much more importantly, in taking 
care of the home front and ensuring that their children excelled academically and socially. 
Given the obvious restrictions dictated by the format, all I am trying to achieve here is 
beginning to focus on embodied, material and gendered forms of elite reproduction as 
auspicated by the Gens manifesto (Bear et al) through some initial, ethnographic based 
evidence.  
 
1. Young flesh and charity auctions 
 
“We were told to strut, there was a catwalk, and they played “Blurred Lines”1 as 
we entered the room.” 
 
                                                          
1
 Blurred Lines is a notorious pop song that explicitly engages with issues of consent, rape and violence in 
relationships. 
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The girls were young, mostly in their early twenties, some were still teenagers. They had 
been recruited through modelling agencies, assessed on their ‘stats’ – not just height and 
weight, but specific measurements of their thighs, ankles and chests, for example – and then 
graded by a hostess who would decide whether they would stay for the after party or, later, 
for the after-after party, upstairs in the men’s penthouses. This is standard, they were not 
surprised by this, nor by the fact that they were told to leave their phones in their bags, which 
were then taken away from them for the duration of the evening. The reason is the privacy of 
the guests of course, who would not like photographs taken, and the fact that the girls are 
paid to work, not be on their phones: and yet, my respondent explained, what if anything had 
happened and they needed to call for help?  
 
They were given two large glasses of wine to drink, quickly, before entering the ballroom in 
the tiny, revealing black dresses the agency had provided for them. Their instructions were 
to entertain the men, get them to drink but most importantly get them to bid and spend large 
amounts of money. This was an auction after all: a charity auction held in one of the most 
prestigious hotels of Mayfair, the heart of London’s financial district (it is here that hedge 
funds and private equity firms are mainly based; it is here that the family offices that advise 
the most powerful families in the country, and possibly on the planet, base themselves). The 
men were there for what are usually known as ‘male only charity events’, and the role of the 
girls was to increase the amount they would bid. The girls were encouraged to sit on the 
men’s laps, flirt with them – look at them directly in the eyes, the hostess told them – and 
generally flatter them into making substantial bids.  
 
Nothing in this set up is surprising if one is familiar with the night life of Mayfair, where clubs 
jostle for control of the prettiest and youngest girls to attract the wealthiest men and get them 
to spend very substantial amounts of money on drinks. This sort of entertainment is provided 
routinely to investors and business partners, who are wined, dined and entertained to build 
and cement networks and business relationships. This part of Mayfair by night is crucial to 
the operation of the financial centre by day, yet it is hardly ever talked about. Young women’s 
flesh remains one of the main conduits through which the raw financial capital produced in 
the deals is socialized and dispersed.  
 
The young women in question crucially do not get paid: they are taken out by promoters and 
their expenses are paid for: entry to the club, drinks, sometimes dinner. The promoters do 
get paid, by the clubs, according to how many girls they bring, and of what ‘quality’: the girls 
are assessed on their looks, with the best possible look being that of a fashion model, i.e. as 
tall and as skinny as possible. So the promoters try to bring out as many of the best girls as 
possible, to get paid by the clubs: the clubs want the girls in order to attract wealthy men who 
will then spend money on drinks, which is where the clubs make their profits. It is well known 
on the scene that the best clubs are those with the best crowd, meaning the most beautiful 
girls, who bring the wealthiest guys, who pay for crazy drinks and, together with the 
promoters, make great parties happen.  
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The girls I spoke to in this scene were students at very prestigious universities in central 
London, and were often themselves from elite, privileged families. The obvious question for 
me was why they would accept to go out with the promoters on these terms, i.e. without being 
paid, while they were clearly generating money for the clubs. The explanations varied, and 
are consistent with the business model required by the clubs. Many girls would not actually 
be on the scene for a long time; they would like the novelty of going out for free, but then get 
bored with it, or need to focus on their studies, or get into relationships that would take them 
away from clubbing. This suited the promoters, who were always after new girls, fresh faces 
and bodies to please the clubs.  
 
Another explanation focused on the ambiguities that young women would experience around 
their relationship with the promoter as friend but also maybe a potential boyfriend. Once it 
became clear to the girl that he was not interested in her in that way, she may well stop going 
out: these ambiguities also suited promoters as they kept girls coming out with them. In one 
case, a young woman who used to go out for fun started using the scene as an object of 
sociological study for her dissertation instead, subtly subverting the narrative – with which I 
agree entirely – that sees girls as usually unable to capitalize on these transactions, described 
by Mears (2015). 
 
Mears (2015) has described these processes in great detail in relation to the VIP club scene 
in and around New York, arguing that ‘girls’ is a social category that some young women 
inhabit at a certain time in their lives in a certain socio-cultural setting. Crucially, ‘girls’ are 
unable to capitalize on their own value, based mainly on their looks, which is instead 
appropriated and turned into economic and social capital, in the form of profits, salaries and 
networks for the clubs, promoters and clients who enjoy the girls’ presence.  
 
Santos (2013) describes similar patterns in Johannesburg clubs through an anthropological 
framework that connects money, power and music as rituals to further bring forward wealth 
within the club. When individual bottles of champagne in Mayfair routinely sell for over £10K, 
and are accompanied by crews of young, thin and beautiful female bar staff with sparklers 
and theme music – known as champagne trains – in the most exclusive clubs, the excesses 
of JG Ballard novels seem relatively tame. It is indeed hard not to think about potlaches 
(Mauss 1924) and creative disruption (Schumpeter 1949) in relation to these flows and 
exchanges between money, youth, flesh, power and excess consumption.  
 
In this context, it is key to stress how young women perform an essential task in generating 
money for the clubs, but also literally creating a conducive atmosphere to male relationship 
bonding which then generate networking and business deals for the male clients. A passage 
by Mears (2015) here describes this situation very clearly, also highlighting the two 
omnipresent threats of being a) associated with paid sex work, something that both girls and 
promoters want to avoid at all costs and b) being seen as deviating from the heterosexual 
norm. 
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“Most clients and promoters simply believe that a room full of men is less 
comfortable than a room with girls, explained Artem, a Russian male model 
promoting in Hong Kong and NYC:  
 
Sometimes management calls me or big guys calling like, ‘‘Hey I have clients in 
town...’’ Because it’s five guys, with a magnum of champagne, and they look like 
fucking faggots. ‘‘So please,’’ they say, ‘‘get us the girls.’’ So it’s not like 
prostitution and shit like that. They don’t even talk to the girls... They just look 
nice, and it breaks the ice, to get comfortable.” –  
 
  Artem, 28, White promoter for three years, from Russia 
 
These clubs constitute spaces that are exclusive not just of non-heterosexual men, as 
obvious in the quote, but also of female bodies that are not young, thin and model like. They 
are not open to business women, for example, regardless of how wealthy and successful 
they may be, because they are unlikely to be young and thin enough to be allowed through 
the ruthlessly screened doors. Elite London in this sense can be seen as a social space 
structured around strong hierarchies not just of class but also gender, intersecting to create 
what a respondent in the project, a rich, successful business woman, termed ‘patriarchy on 
steroids’. 
 
In this case study young women were key to the night time economy of VIP clubs and parties, 
which is literally predicated upon their bodily capital, used to socialize and redistribute the 
financial capital pouring out of successful deals in the City. What is more their work enabled 
and facilitated the formation and development of elite men’s networks, by providing the right 
atmosphere and backdrop where they could relax and strengthen their own relationships, 
which we know to be a crucial part of elites’ reproduction strategies. We now move on to a 
very different set of case studies where women’s work is more closely aligned with the 
traditional idea of gendered reproduction, i.e. the care for their family, home and, most of all, 
the achievements of their children.  
 
2. “They juggle a lot of balls up in the air, and if they fall it’s a long way 
down”  
 
Symbolically and socially opposite to the ‘girls’ as a category, and geographically removed 
from the clubs of central London that their men patronized after work, were ‘the wives’, living 
in big houses in the suburbs. Unsurprisingly, these women turned out to be diverse and not 
very much like the stereotypes of the ‘ladies who lunch’. They knew the stereotypes very well 
of course, and played with them. Their houses were undoubtedly big and expensive: big 
gardens, many rooms, often a swimming-pool in the grounds, or the basement, or both. They 
all had staff, some more than others. The women who said they did not have staff usually 
meant that they did not live in: it was a given that it was not them who were cleaning the 
houses or looking after the gardens.  
III Working paper 7                                                     Luna Glucksberg 
 
14 
 
 
 
What they wanted to get across, in all of the interviews, was that being them was not easy. 
Managing their homes and ensuring the smooth climb of their husbands’ careers by taking 
care of absolutely everything else was a demanding job, and their husbands were used to 
efficient and effective staff themselves. Indeed, in a popular but well researched book, 
academic turned journalist Wednesday Martin (2015), has recently shown how some elite 
wives of New York routinely get ‘bonuses’ according to how they have performed that year 
and whether the children have got into the right schools, for example. While I did not find any 
evidence of this myself, the set up I observed would make it eminently plausible, and possible.  
 
It was routine for these women to leave their career when they had children: this was not 
always their preference, but it was clear to them that their husbands were not going to 
advance in their careers unless ‘the home front’ was taken care of, meaning that there had 
to be a wife to look after everything else, leaving the man free to work and socialize with the 
clients unencumbered by any caring responsibility. Things seem to not have changed 
substantially from over thirty years ago, when Ostrander (1984) was describing exactly the 
same processes being at play for upper class American women in the early Eighties.  
 
They were not all wives, and not all of them had children; a minority had made money 
independently, but the majority were wealthy through their husbands, current or past, or 
through inheritance and divorce settlements. The kind of settlements that shake the stock 
market, because their CEOs husbands have to flood the market with shares in order to pay 
out what they owe their wives.  
 
One of them was called Natasha: she was Russian and had lived through the collapse of the 
USSR, having to re-invent herself as a hotel manager after abandoning a promising career 
as a scientist. She had a PhD and worked in a hospital, but after months of her salary going 
unpaid and no prospects of things getting better, she emigrated to Germany and changed 
her career entirely, becoming so successful in her new role that she travelled the world on 
business, which is how she met her current, rich husband. As many of the women 
interviewed, she had a successful career before her marriage, and she now uses the skills 
and education she had to make sure her children succeed in every possible way, which for 
now means doing well in their education.  
 
Talking incredibly fast, she ploughed through the weekend schedule of her three children, 
which sounded more demanding than what most adults would take on during a working week, 
let alone a weekend. They all attended top ranking private schools, of course, but also excel 
at ballet and rugby and are fluent in Russian; there are sessions in all these, and more, 
disciplines for each child every weekend. There is not much time left at the end of it all: “we 
just don’t get to sit in front of the sofa and relax. I don’t know how people do it, where do they 
find the time?”. She is responsible for taking the children to the activities, selecting the classes 
and monitoring the instructors, as well as hiring the tutors for extra sessions in any subject 
that they may not be at the top of the class for. She explained how the real cost of private 
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school was not the fees, oh no, she pitied the poor parents who think that’s it, they kill 
themselves to get the children through the door without realizing the obscene amount of 
money required for extra tuition and activities, without which there is absolutely no point in 
sending them there at all. “They just don’t know, but someone should tell them!”  
 
Most of the women do more than run the children’s education, usually entirely on their own 
because the husbands work incredibly long hours. They also run their homes, managing staff 
and cycles of endless decorating required to keep the house as it should be, whether for 
entertainment purposes – deals may require inviting clients at home – or to keep the value of 
those properties stable or going up. Many work in property development as a side line, 
making considerable amounts of money selling and developing properties, often through the 
networks that they have established around themselves while simply looking like ‘ladies who 
lunch’.  
 
All the same, their standard response to questions about what they do is that they do not do 
anything, it is their husbands who work: their own labour, crucial as it is to the successful 
reproduction of the next elite generation, is often unrecognized even by the women who 
perform it. In her work with rural women in Poland after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
anthropologist Frances Pine (2000) showed how farm labour was not thought of as ‘labour’ 
or work, as such, by the women. Although it took up a very considerable amount of hours in 
their daily lives, while they were also employed full time in industry and usually caring for their 
families, farming was not something that women ‘did’, as such: it was enmeshed in kinship 
and not separable as a practice, as it was for men instead, who were farmers and recognized 
as such by themselves and society at large.  
 
It is easy to miss important parts of what is happening in a given situation for a researcher, 
even more so if the respondents themselves do not think of that something as a ‘thing’ in and 
of itself. Back in the exclusive suburb, as far away from rural Poland as could be, the women 
talked about themselves jokingly as ‘ladies who lunch’. They knew the stereotype, they knew 
they were privileged, and they played to the role, explaining how they did nothing really, just 
met their friends for coffee. Only, it was never just that. The nothing may well include moving 
an entire family to a different country at almost no notice, over the Christmas holidays, 
because of a promotion received by the husband: “Just make it happen” he said. “So of 
course, I did it”.  
 
Analysis 
 
The successful transfer of wealth from one generation to the next is a key concern of the very 
wealthy, especially at a time when the weight of accumulated capital plays an ever greater 
part in individuals’ likeliness to belong to the top of the elite usually referred to as ‘the super-
rich’. Savage (2015) uses the image of climbing mountains as a metaphor for achieving elite 
status, stressing how much easier it is to get to the top for those who start higher up, and can 
afford the best kit. 
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“What we have seen in Britain – as in many nations – is an increasingly 
vertiginous social landscape, with a lot more total economic capital – a lot more 
rock and earth – and with the highest mountains now rising much further above 
the valley than they did three decades ago. […] In the competition to get to the 
top, however, those who join the meritocratic route to the summit from the 
highest base camp have much better prospects of getting to the top. […] Their 
chances are even better if they can mobilize and combine every advantage 
possible – their economic, social and cultural capital – so that they have the 
most effective kit on their arduous adventure.” 
 
 (Savage 2015: 188-189) 
 
The examples explored in this chapter showed very clearly how women’s labour enabled and 
facilitated the climbs of men. On the one hand they covered ‘the home front’, taking care of 
absolutely everything so that their men could focus on their work, just as the upper class 
women described by Ostrander (1984) did in the seventies. Secondly they invested heavily, 
to the point of leaving their own paid careers – their chance to climb the slopes independently 
– in the education and all round development of their children, ensuring not just access to the 
best school but also monitoring performance and facilitating their social activities. In this 
sense, if we continue with the climbing metaphor, they made sure the base camp for the next 
generation was as high up as possible, and literally carried their children there. Thirdly, in a 
different context, their labour created a functional backdrop where men could forge their own 
exclusive business and friendship networks without ever breaking hetero-normative 
requirements. Indeed, the practice of pursuing ‘girls’ in the clubs reinforced the executives’ 
selves as highly masculine and hyper achieving and successful. 
 
Intertwined with these very obvious contributions, however, was the realization of how the 
labour performed was usually invisible and un-recognized, even by the women who 
performed it themselves. This misrecognition – the party girls who are just out to have fun, or 
the mothers who are just looking after their children – is in a sense in-line with the devaluation 
of all domestic and reproductive labour, which is usually but not always performed by women. 
This devaluation is in itself typical of a patriarchal paradigm whereby it is only ‘productive’ 
labour that takes place outside the household that is recognized – both in terms of a salary 
but also of being seen, i.e. being perceived as socially valuable.  
 
This devaluation is also in line with the surprisingly – for the author, at least – rigid gender 
roles and norms that I witnessed in the course of fieldwork. Mistakenly I assumed that being 
wealthy and often having at their disposal substantial amounts of economic, social and 
symbolic capital themselves – even if it was less than what their men commanded – would 
mean the women would be less in thrall to patriarchal norms. In reality those norms were 
even more rigid the further up the social hierarchy I moved: the strictly policed boundaries of 
morality – what is acceptable for ‘party girls’ in terms of having fun but never accepting gifts 
in cash, for example; the double standards expected by the business men who partied with 
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the girls while their wives in the suburbs looked after the children; the expectations that the 
only truly correct choice for elite girls – the daughters, in this case – was marriage and 
children, and so on.  
 
More than thirty years ago, Ostrander (1984) concluded that upper class US women accepted 
subordination to their husbands, instead of challenging the norms that the sexual revolution 
of the sixties and counter-culture of the seventies had put under considerable amount of 
pressure, because in doing so they preserved their privileged class position. Although I 
cannot come to such an explicit conclusion myself, because I did not frame the research in a 
way that would allow me to do so, I strongly suspect that a similar dynamic may still be at 
play amongst the elite women that were the focus of this chapter. At the very least, this data 
makes the case for the need to focus much more on the interplay between gender and class 
in elite contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Dynasty making is a key concern of elite families: it is pursued through long-lasting, 
successful marriages as well as the most tax efficient transfers of inheritances. It is bound up 
with children’s education as well as their broader socialization and, eventually, their own 
appropriate, class compatible marriages. Just as economic capital needs to be protected and 
increased, so does the family. These are long term, intergenerational concerns that fit well 
with Savage’s (2015), Piketty’s (2014) and Khan’s (2012) focus on the long duree of 
accumulation processes and the structural, as well as cultural, processes that make elite 
reproduction possible.  
 
The data presented in this chapter showed how in the key processes of transfer and 
reproduction of wealth, and of the humans able to manage and grow that wealth, women’s 
work is clearly central. I have focused on the how, and in doing so have opened up spaces 
to consider, this time, the two seemingly antithetical categories of ‘girls’ and ‘mothers’.  
 
The intense, gendered labour of these women may well be at least partly responsible for the 
above average marriage rates that billionaire men seem to achieve. In the same way 
women’s work – invisible as it may be (Ostrander 1984) – is crucial in placing and helping of 
children achieve their potential through exclusive, private educational establishments. Finally 
the ‘girls’ (Mayers 2015) role was crucial in constituting the spaces where masculinity could 
be performed as a male bonding strategy amongst business executives. 
 
In light of this data, elite London has emerged as a social space structured around strong 
hierarchies not just of class but also gender. I would therefore argue that it is essential to 
understand more about the interplay of these two structuring principles within elite spaces, 
focusing on the ‘invisible’ labour performed by elite women. 
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